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IMPUTED

NEGL IGENCE.

The bramch of law about whiCI this paper will treat
is known as imputed or vicarious negligence.
tion presents itself'

when the plaintifff,

The ques-

although not

chargeable with personal negligence is not allowed to recover because of the negligence of the person in privity
with hira, which negligdrice is imputed to him as though it
were his own.

There must be some relation between the

plaintiff and the third person which the law recognizes
and from which a legal responsibility may arise.
The whole subject :cay be reduced to the three following rules:
I.

There must be a third person and such person
must be guilty of negligente.

II.

This negligence must be approximate cause of the
harm suffered.

III. The plaintiff is to be charged with this negligence as though it

were his own.

2

As mere legal doetrirnes these rules are clear and
i
eonese but as soon as you attempt to apply them, you are
surrounded oy

difftieulties

as perplexing and as hard to

master as were ever presented to a court for its sonsiderat ion.

PART

I.

Where the plaintiff involuntarily plaees himself' under the control of another.
The principle question to be taken up in this chapter

is

the discussion of' the imputability of a parent's

negligence to the child.

In order to give a comprehen-

sive idea of' the subject, it will be necessary to divide
it

into the following sub-divisions.
(1).

At what age is

(2).

The imputability of a parent's or guardian's

a child sui juris

?

negligence to a child, when parent or guardixi sues in
behalf of' the child.
(3).

The imputability of a parert's

or guardian's

negligence to a child when parent or guardian brings the
aetion in his own nane for his own benefit.

(1).

At what age is

a child sui juris

?

The courts in this country evidently entertain a

quite varied and widely different opinion of' the in.ental
ability of their youths.

One court holding as a matter

of law an infant of one year and five months old to be
sui juris and the court ofAkstate, not very far distant,
saying an infant of seven was non sui juris.
In 3

N.Y.

455 the court said: "An infant in its

first years is non sui juris.

It belongs to another to

whom discretion in the care of its person is exclusively

confided."

155 Mass. 13 says it is a question for the

jury to say whether a child not quite seven is sui juris
and capable of negligence.
ease of ar

114 N.C. 69 i held in the

infant twenty-two months old:"It is admitted

by the pleadings that the plaintiff at the time was an
infant of tender years.

From the language of the admis-

sion we would, if necessary for a decision, be well warranted in holding that prima faeie the in'ant was of such
tender age as to be incapable of negligence or non sul

juris."
Thus the age fixed in 41 Iowa 71 withih which a child
was non sui juris was two years.

In 58 Ill. 226 the age

was five and in 38 Wisconsin 614 the court said the child
must be eight to pass beyond the age of non sui juris.

But while a few of the courts have decided the matter

as one of capacity and law,

many of, thle courts

a question of' capacity and fact and require the

is

say it

still

jury to determine the matter.

The eases cited in the

next sub-division furnish ample authority for this last
proposition.

2.

Irputability of a parent's or custodian's negli-

genee to a child when parent or custodian sues in behalf'
of a child.
The leading ease which establishes the rule of imputing the negligence of the parent to the child and the
one upon which most,

if

riot all

the courts adopting the

doctrine have relied, is Hartfield vs. Roper reported in
21 Wend. 615.

The facts are thus.

The plaintiff, a

child then of about two years of age was standing or
sitting

in

a beaten track of a public highway arid no per-

son near him.

The defendant, Roper, was driving a

sleigh ard horses and 'before the child was pereeived ,the
horses passed over him.

The child was seriously injured

and suffered greatly for about two months aAd considerable expense was incurred in medical attendance.

The

jury brought in a verdict for five hundred dollars for
the plaintiff.

On the argument for a new trial the mush

quoted decision of Judge Cowen made its appearance.

He

held that the plaintiff should have been non-suited and
in part said:

"To allow small children to resort to the

highway is criminal negligence.
juris.

An infant is non sui

He belongs to another to whom discretion in the

care of his person is exclusively confided."

The person

id keeper and agent for this purpose and in respect to
third persons, his acts must le assumed that of the infants, his neglect the infant's neglect.

"In the present

ease the infant has neglected to fulfill the conditions
on which he could sue or his guardiarn has done so which
amounts to the same thing."
The first departure in this state from the doctrine
is in 47 N.Y. 317.

In this case the court said, if the

conduct of the child would not have amounted to rigligenee in an adult and the injury was caused wholly by the
defendant's negligence, the negligence of the parent
would be too remote.
Thus the doctrine remained until the court in 63
N.Y. 104, although sustaining the former ease broadened

it a trifle by holding that the negligence of a pareat
can not as a inatter of law defeat an action brought by
the child.

It is a question solely for the jury to say

whether the negligence is such as would defeat the action.

The combination of these two cases seemed to

quite satisfactorily settle the questiou for a long time
and it was given a well deserved rest.

But recently a

doubt arose in the minds of some, as to whether the court
still favored such a holding and in 139 N.Y. 490, which
is the last reported case on the subject, the question
again presented itself.

The court simply reaffirmed the

two former decisions by the following language.

"The

contributory negligence of a child will not shield a defendant from liability unless the jury determine the parent was actually guilty of negligence in exposirng it."
The rule established in New York *Ias been followed
to a greater or less degree in lany states.

Some of the

courts base their decisions upon the ground that the parent must be deemed the agent of the child, while in other
states the courts refused to consider the question of
agency and based their decisions upon the ground that the
child is identified with his parent or guardian.

Mass. seems to have followed the Hartfield vs. Roper
rulw about as closely as any of the states where the ques
tion has been agitated.

in 135 Mass. 333, the court

said in the case of a child eight and one half year's of
age:

"

His injury was the natural consequence of his

carelessness.

If he was too young to appreciate the

danger of his act, he was too young to engage in that
sport - catching on sleighs - and if too young, his parents were negligent in permitting it.

Thus, whether the

defendant was negligent or not, the plaintiff should not
recover."
This case was sustained in 142 Mass. 313 arid in this
latter case the court, like the New York courts, held if
the child, without being able to exercise any judgment in
regard to a matter, does no act which prudence would forbid or which would not be careless in a prudent person of
tature years and intelligence, then there is no negligence that would bar recovery.
Illinois P-irnishes us with the "comparative" negligence doctrine.

In 48 Ill. 221 the court said, that if

the parent was guilty of gross negligence in exposing a

child and the delendant's negligence was only slight or

ordinary, the child could not recover, but should seek
his remedy against the parent.

Thus if

the fact s had

been vice versa and the defendant had been the one guilty of gross negligence, the child could have maintained
his action.
The following states in addition to those already
cited have for the reasons above set forth or for no reason whatever, followed the early New York doctrine.
63 Maine 552.

51 Cal.

513.

29 MinrLe. 336.
31 Maryland 439.

Limited slightly by

43 Maryland 539.
46 Indiana 25.
97 Illinois 66.
28 Kansas 541.
9 Bush (Ky.)
Although

it

522.
is

ULt the object of this

paper to

un-

dertake to refute any rules or lines of decisions which
have been established,
leading cases in

still

I shall endeavor to cite the

opposition and advance any reasonable

arguments that appear to dispute such a ruling.
The leading and probably the most important of all
cases, repudiating the rule of' Hartfield vs. Roper, is
Robinson vs. Cone,
in

reported in 22 Vermont 213 and decided

the Supreme Court of Vermont in

1850.

In

this

case,

the plaintiff, a boy less than four years of age, amused
himself by sliding down hill on his sled, and while engaged in this sport was run down bp a two horse sleigh
of the defendant's, who drove down the hill on a "smart
trot".
The court denied all former doctrines of imputed
negligence and held that although a child of tender years
may be in the highway through the fault or negligence of
his parernts and so be improperly there, yet if he be injured through the negligence of the defendant, 1hw
precluded from his action.

is not

They hold that all that is

required of an infant plaintiff in such a case, is that
he should exercise care and prudence equal to his capacity.
In those states where the New York doctrine of imputed negligence has been established, the arguments have
resulted largely from dicta of preceding cases and based

on a very superficial view of the subject.

The courts

have reasoned from the usual and pecuniary responsibilities of parents for the support and education of their
offspring, and in doing this, they have entirely overlooked the other relationsof parent and child.

They rney-

er mention the irresponsibility of the former for the
torts and unnecessary debts of the latter and also the
fact that the child is never liable for the debts of the
father.

They appear to have reached their conclusions

through some vague sense of a just identification of the
two under all circumstances.

Penna. immediately favored

the Vermont idea and a late case reported in 113 Pa. St.
162, and also one which clearly illustrates the position
which this state has always taken, says :

"A child of

the age of eight years will not be held to be guilty of
contributory negligence and the negligence of the parent
will not be imputed to him."

Besides the states already

mentioned, the following states sustain and in most of
the cases cited, directly refer to and affirm the rule
laid down in Robinson vs. Cone.
27 Gratt.
53 Ala. 70

(Vir.)

455

I Head (Terai.)

610.

30 Ohio St. 451.
37 Corin. !9.
75 Mo. 542.
16

,,ebraska 13.

60 Texas 205.
76 lo',,,a 3 46.

66 :Iiss.

560.

77 Georgia 102.
19 At.

Rep.

61 Wis.
57 Mich.

( N.J. ) 1102.

357.
107.
In

The federal courts take a very decided stand.
17 Wall. 657 in the celebrated "turn-table" case, the

court said the care aad caution required of a child is
determined by its maturity and capacity and in each case
is regulated by the circumstances of that ease.

It di-

rectly concurs with the Vermont rule and squarely rejects
the principles of the Hartfield vs. Roper case.
The court in a New York case already cited says :
"The infant is non sui juris.

He belongs to another to

whom discretion in the care of his person is exclusively

confided.

His acts must be deemed those of the infant;

his neglect the infant's neglect."

It will be observed

that the substance of' the quotation is
a fact ard a deductioi. from it.

the statement of

The premises being that

the child id in the care of' the parent and from these
premises they draw the inference

that the neglect of the

parent is the neglect of the child.
low ?

But does this fol-

How does the custody cf the infant in

justify the imputation of his fault to him ?

the parent
The law

puts the custody of an infant in the parent but this does
net give the parent the right to waver or forfeit any of
the legal rights of the infant.

When the law gives the

power to protect, it seems quite inconsistent to construe
it into a power to harm either by omission or commission.
The child, though &ften inevitably visited with the
imperfection of the father and remote ancestors through a
physical and moral connection should not, in law or justice, be bound by the conduct and actions of his parents
over whom he has had no sort of control.

As was said

in a Tenn. case (1 Head 610) "It would literally be to
visit

the transgressions of' the parent upon the infant."

The essence of' justice was very wisely expressed by the

poet when he said :

"Where the offence is

let the great

axe fall."

3.

Imputability of a parent's negligence to the child

when the parent sues in his own naine and in his ova. behalf.
In an actio.

of this nature it is very justly and

almost uniformly held that the contributory negligence of
a parent may be shown to bar a recovery.

It seems al-

most impossible to come te any different conclusion, as
suck a condition of affairs quite clearly puts the subject under the general rule of contributory negligence.
Parents of young children must exercise care with reference to their tender years and to dangers that are known
or might have been known bythe use of ordinary care.

If

they fail to do this they are negligent and should not be
allowed to recover.
The earliest case en this subject is found in 24
Ohio St. 670 (Bellefontaine Railway Co. Ys. Snyder).

This was an action by the father for damages for ea. injury to his daughter.

The care and custody of the infant

had been entrusted to a custodian.

The child was in-

jured through the combined negligence of the custodian
and railroad company.

The court said the sustodian of

the child was agent for the parent and his negligence was
the negligence of the principal or parent.

The case

very cliarly distinguishes between suing in behalf of
the child and suing in parent's name for loss of services
of the child.
There is a case in 18 Ohio St. 3Q9

where the child

brought an action through his guardian for negligence of
a defendant and was allowed to recover-

Probably the

father, elated over the success of' the child saw no reason why he should not share some of the benefits, and
accordingly he brought an action which is reported in 24
Ohio St. 670.

The court in this latter case after very

concisely telling the parent that "he ougkt 't have let
well enough alony"

,

denied a recovery.

As I have said, the courts in this country are for
once entirely of one Opinion.

In some states, it holds

as a sort of refinement er limitation to the rule that it
may be a matter to go to the jury, in case the parent is
poor and destitute of means for safely restraining the
child, whether or not care in proportion to the circum-

stances was displayed.
In

a case re)orted in 75 Pa. St. 257 the court came

very clearly and said :

"To suffer the child to warder

on the streets has a sense of permit.
assertion of' a principle.

This is only the

But whether the mother did

suffer the child so to wander is a matter of fact.

The

care she must use depends entirely upon circumstances."
In the present case the mother gave her child a piece of
bread to satisfy it, closed the door to keep it in and
went to the next room to scrub.

Before the labor was

finished and in less than five minutes the mangled body
of her little onte was brought in and placed before her.
Because the child managed to lift the latch and disappear
can it be said that ahe was negligent per se and tk&t she
suffered her child to wander in the street ?

The cases

which impute the negligence of a parent in such an instance ought to be and certainly is repulsive to all our
natural. instincts.

The case seemed to have quite an in-

fluence upon the courts of this counAtry, as at the present time the majority of them have taken similar positions.

The following three cases are very clear and

appear to be the leading
the general rule.

cases on the modification of

60 Wissouri 475; 41 Iowa 171; 61

Wis.

357.
Very closely connected with this

ject, is the case where the parent

phase of the subsues as administrator

for the child and will inherit from the child either all
or part of the amount recovered.
As usual the different courts corflict very severely
with each other in their holdings.

The more one studies

the various questions en imputed negligence the more firm
ly he becomes convinced that the courts, instead of endeavoring to establish some principles for these cases,
are afraid of the questior. and each is waiting for the
other to make the start to establish some rule that will
be satisfactory

to all.

Iowa seems to have the honor of' having the leading
case on this last proposition.
396.

It is found in 78 Iowa

The court held that where a child was killed by

the negligence of another, the parent, although contributing to the injury, may recover as administrator.

Such

a right does not seem to be affected by the fact that the
negligent parent will inherit the child's estate and this
same state holds that it

the act ior, had been in the par-

ent's name under the circumstances, no recovery would be

possible.
Virginia in 13 S.E. 454 follows this holding and

most of the Southern states seem to agree to a greater or
less degree with these decisions.
that

where the father

is

sole heir

A few states hold
he can :iot recover and

many states repudiate the whole idea, and say it presents
a case exactly similar to a father tuing in his own behalf.

60 Texas 205 emphatically denies the right of re-

covery in a suit brought by a father as administrator of
a child and it will be remembered that this was one of
the states which did not impute the parent's negligence
to the child.

29 Barb. 234 holds that only nominal dam-

ages should be given.

It says the interests the next of

kin have in the life of a child negligently killed is only a pecuniary one.

"The life of a small child however

valuable in other respects to a parent has no pecuniary

value."
Thus the states are divided.
for one reason and another

One holding one way

a contrary way for the same

or for perhaps a slightly different reason.

In some

states the child receives the same measure of justice to

which every one is

entitled who brings ai. action in

court;

in other states it would have been far better for the
child if he had been an animal or an oyster or anything
you can imagine except a human being.

For if he were

any of the former objects or things in those very states
where they deny a recovery to a child, he could have recovered and his owner who sued for his injury would have
been allowed more than "mere nominal damages."

Custodian and Lunatic.

All that has been said concerning children is equally applicable to lunatics.

There have been very few

cases on this subject and very few writers even mention
the subject.

The decisions in the parent and child cas-

es very fully determine and settle this question.
In 14. Barb. 585 a lunatic was traveling on a train
in the custody of his father.
one car and took a seat

The father left him in

in anether.

The lunatic

ing to pay his fare was put off and was
train and killed.

ni

refus-

over by a

The court said the reasoning in the

Hartfteld vs. Roper case is entirely applicable to the
present circumstances.

lhus it held that the father's

negligence was imputed to the lunatic and the father as
administrator of the lunatic could rot recover.

The

court in the Hartfield vs. Roper case in a bit of dicta
says:

"Suppose a hopeless lunatic, suffered to stray by

his guardian, is injured; shall the person who unfortunately strikes or injures him be made amenable in damages*
Certainly the neglect of the guardian ought to be imputed
to him.
It would almost follow that the states that impute
the negligence of the parent to the okild would make no
distinction in the case of a lunatic,

There is certain-

ly no essential difference between them.

Neither have

sufficient capacity or discretion to understand danger
and to use the proper reans to guard against it.

To be

sure there might be a slight distinction in the obligation of others toward them.

The sight of a child in

peril ought to induce every mature person to use greater
care than he ordinarily would use; whereas a lunatic does
net necessarily manifest his infirmity by his appearance
and one who is not aware of the fact could hardly be

as
blamed as much in the case of an infant.

But as this

difference in obligation Is net strong enough to persuade
a court to hold one way in the case of an infant arid
contra in regard to the lunatic there is no other conclusion than that the obligationsof the one are encumbered
upon the other and such rights as are given to the infant
must be bestowed en the lunatic.

PART

Where the plaintiff

I I.

voluntarily places himself

or

his property in charge of' another.
1.

Where the plaintiff

volurarily

places his

per-

son in charge of one who exercises control over a public
vehicle.
It was for a long time a disputed question in England and also in this counry, whether a passenger in a
public vehicle, who had been injured by the negligence of
a third person, to which injury the person managing the
public conveyance had contributed, could recover against
said third

person or whether the very act of the passen-

ger placing himself in charge of the manager of the public
tion

conveyance, did net establish suck an intimate relabetween them that

in case of accident,

the negligence

ef the manager was to be considered the negligence of the
passenger adid thus deny a recovery by the passenger.
The weight of authority in England seems to be that

in

such a ease the negligence of the driver is as complete a

bar as if

it

were the negligence of, the passenger himself.

On this side of the Atlantic there now exists very little
difference of opinion among tire courts which have had occasion to take the subject under judicial co (n4Zaflce.
Among the earliest cases and perhaps the one whick is tke
leading authority on the doctrine of identification is
the famous case of Thorogood vs. Bryan reported in 8 C.B.
115.

The facts are as Vollows:

A passenger in an orAni-

bus was injured in a collision caused by the cemhined
negligence of the driver of a second omnibus and the
driver of the omnibus in which the plaintiff was riding.
The passenger brought an action against the driver of
said second omnibus.

The court, by a very skillful and

entirely new application of the old Roman doctrine of
identification hold that a passenger in a public vehicle,
thoughihaving no control over the driver, must be held to
be so identified with the vehicle or driver as to be
chargeable with any negligence on the part of the driver
which contributed to the injury inflicted upon the pas-

senger.
The Aaaerican courts at once recognized the indefensible grounds upon wkich the opinion was based and gener-

ally-repudiated the doctrine.
Upon reflection it does seem a trifle

hard wid strange

to identify a passenger with a negligent driver of a vehicle i:n whicl

he is riding.

The only possible way in

which the identification could be founded is by treating
the driver as a servant of the passenger.

But even this

we could not do as our daily experience in the world shows
us that the passenger exercises no control whatever ever
the driver or engineer

f' a public vehicle; and it is

this right to central the conduct of a servant, that is
the fTundation of' thip doctrine that the master is affected by the acts of the servant.
The principle which may be properly denominated the
American rule is set forth by Mr. Justice Field in the
case of Little vs. Hackett reported in 116 U.S. 366.
In this case the plaintirf hired a carriage and a pair of
horses from a livery stable.

The driver was an eaplayee

of the proprietor of the stables and the plaintiff exercised no further control over him than to direct the extent of tke drive.

While crossing a railread track, by

the joint negligence of the driver in going on the track
without carefully looking up and down the line, and of

the defendant in net sounding the bell or whistle, the
carriage was struck and plaintiff seriously injured.
The defendant set uptne negligence of the driver was imputable to the plaintiff and that the relation of master
and servant existed between them.
It was held that the passenger was nio

reoponsible

for the acts or negligence of the driver and was not
prevented from recovering for the injuries he received.
The case of Thoregood vs. Bryan was very sharply criticised and thoroughly disapproved.
As will be shown, the courts appear to draw no distinction in principle whether the passenger be on&, public conveyance like a railroad train or an emnibus, or be
in a hack hired from a public stand in the streets.
These in the hack do riot become responsible for the negligence of the driver if they exercise no further control

ever him than to indicate the route they wish to

travel or the places to whish they wisk to go.

If by

any fictio% the driver is to be considered the agent, so
that his negligence can be impkted to the passenger and
so prevent the passenger's recovery against a third person, the driver will be the agent in

all

other respects,

so far as the management of the veikcle is concerned; and
thuis responsibility will attach to passengers for any
injury caused by the driver in the course of his et&ploynient.

But according to any recognized principles of law

can such a responsibility be fastened upon one wkh
noe way controlled or interfered with the
the injury ?

Clearly not.

has in

causing

To be held responsible a

person must exercise some authority over the subject or
thing causing the injury.

This proposition is too ob-

vious to require authorities to be cited to sustain it.
The following cases each one representing the doctrine of its respective state sustain the principles set
forth by the U. S. court in Little vs. Hackett.
40 State Reporter 948.

Same case affirried without an

opinion in 133 N.Y. 563.
155 Mass. 331.
36 N.J.L. 245.
105 Ill. 364.
66 Cal.

163.

90 Izdi.

545.

7 At.
$7 Ala.

?ep.

105.

610.

(4aryland).

87 Texas 553.
38 La. Anno. 185.
102 1Uo.

542.

85 Virginia 939.
86 Zenl.

578.

There are numerous other decisions to the s8Yae ef-

fect.

In fact it

is

a unanimous cor clusion of the

courts in this country tkat the passenger may sue the
stranger and that the negligence of the driver is not imputed to the passenger.

The following states make up

the exception that proves the rule.

In Penna. the

courts, although the negligence of the driver is not imputed to the passenger, say that the passenger should be
confined to a remledy against the carrier having ckarge ar
him.

This is only adopted where the vehicle is r'anaged

by a common carrier and the courts admit #hat it is a
mere arbitrary rule and only for the sake of convenience.

46 Pa. St. 151.
97 Pa. St. 91.
In 38 Vermont 440 in some dicta is found the rule of
this state.

They base their decision upon the assumed

theory that the driver is the agent of the passenger and

his negligence is attended by the sane consequences which
would result

from the passenger's own neglect.

On an examination of the cases cited one may easily
see how thoroughly the English rule has been controverted.

In scarcely a single case has an opinion been writ-

ten.without directly referring to it and giving it a hard
It

rub.

seems almost incredible that any fair minded

and reasonable man could arrive at any different conclusion.

The passenger is a perfectly irulocent party, hav-

ing no coi.trol over either of the wrong doers.

What

reason is there to prevent him from recovering from either

of t-e

negligent parties

?

Surely, according to the

usual rules of justice there is none and hence an action

should lie in his behalf.

2.

Where a shipper places his property under one in

charge of a public vehicle or ce--mon carrier.
At the first glance, this proposition seems quite
similar to the last one treated.

But upon a closer ex-

amination of the question, one readily finds that they
are built

different foundatioi;s.

In this latter

case the doctrine of principal and agent is invoked.

The skipper by his very act of trusting the goods to the
care of a carrier constitutes that carrier his agent.
Such being the case he should recover only when his agent
is free fwom fault.

Although, it is a question that

has received very little attention by the text book
writers and the cases in point are veryffew, still the
cases that have been found are almost uniform in holding
that the shipper id imputed with the negligence of his
carrier so as to prevent a recovery.
The first case where the precise question waa before
the court was in 6 Wharton 311.

The court held that the

rule that in case of' loss for mutual negligence, neither
party could recover, governed the case of shippers of
goods on public vehicles which have come into collision
to the injury of the goods, as well as the owners of such
vehicles themselves.

In its opinion the court says:

"There is at least a privitive contract betwixt the merchant and his carrier; and the former when he commits the
mianagement and direction of his goods to the latter, giving him, as he does, authority to labor and travail about
the transportation of them he necessarily constitutes the
carrier to a great extent his agent.

The courts that have arrived at a similar conclusion
and in

fact

about all the states

that have had the question presented, are:
15 Ark. 188.
69 N.Y. 470.

45 Am.

Dec. 47 (Ken.)

2 Pick. 621.
1 M.N.

169.

Each one of the above cases cites with approval the
Penna. case in 6 Wharton 311 and all are entirely uniform
in their holding.

3.

Where the plaintiff

places himself under one in

charge of a private vehicle.
The question that presents itself

to us in this

pro-

position has been decided in many and various ways.

The

courts that impute the negligence of the driver to the
plaintiff base their decisions either upon the "unexplained identity" of position between the plaintiff and
the person by whose contributory negligence his right of
action is effected, or else upon the ground that such a
person has been accepted as his agent, so that the ug-

ligence of the plaintiff.

This latter reason has at

least some justification, as one voluntarily in a private
carriage, trusts his personal safety to the person in
control of it.

By the voluntary entrance into the con-

veyance the plaintiff adepts, for the time being, the vehicle as his own and he jointly assumes the risk with the
person guiding it.

it

must be admitted there is a per-

sonal trust in such cases, which implies an agency.
On the other hand, let us look at the other side of
the questioi.

Can the doctrine of agency be applied to

affect the plaintiff's right of action, if in fact there
is no agency existing in law either actual or implied.
Agency must always involve authority, actual or assumed,
ever the conduct of' the person and in that business where
in he was regligent.

In the case under consideration

the plaintiff simply rides along as a guest.
vited to take a drive and he accepts.

He is in-

In such a case

does he authorize the driver to act negligently

Does

he have any moral or legal right or power to control the
actions of his host ?

To be clear, imagine you were
A

driving, for example, and invited a friend to go with you.
Do you think he would immediately begin to tell you that

you should not drive here or it would be negligent to go
there and that you must drive somewhere else '?

Certain-

ly such is not our every day experience and it would be
very hard to accede to the proposition that the driver of
a private carriage becomes the agent of the person riding
with him in any such a way as to make the negligence of'
the former the negligence of the latter.
Of cotirse, it is no less the duty of the plaintiff,
where he has an opportunity to do so",than of' the driver
to learn of the danger and to avoid it, if possible.

If

he has a better chance to discover danger or he is already aware of' some hidden danger, it is his moral duty
to inform the driver and in case of his failure so to do,
his recovery should be barred.

But the rule that the

driver's negligence will or will net be imputed to the
plaintiff should not be applied to this case.

It is an

entirely different question and one so obvious that, it
needs no further attention.
The weight of autkority in

this country seens to be

opposed to imputing the negligence of the driver to the
plaintiff-

In 66 N.Y. 11 in a very learned and well

written opinion the court very thoroughly discussed the

subject ar

held that a passenger in

a buggy of another

person was riot affected by the negligence of the latter.

lh the course of his opinion Judge Church says: "The acceptance of an invitation to ride creates no more responsibility for the acts of the driver, than the riding ii a
stage coach or even in a train of cars, providing there
is

no negligence on account of' the character or Cbndition

of the driver, or the safety of the vehicle or otherwise.
It is no excuse for the negligence of the defendant that
another person's negligence contributed to the injury for
whose act the plaintiff was not responsible."
129 Pa. St 543 fully sustains the New York rule but
says when a person riding by invitation in a private vehicle in eharge of another, remains in it with knowledge
that he is approaching a hidden danger and without any re
quest to the driver to stop, such an one is guilty of
contributory negligence.
The New York doctrine has been followed very closely by almost every court ii.the United States.
the leading cases are :
115 Ind.
89 Ala.

115.
521

Among

72 Texas 643.
75 Iowa 314.
50 N.H. 420.
46 Mich. 596.
51 Fed. 174.
39 Me. 443.
35 Nirme.

522.

36 Ohio St.
105 Ill.
47 I.J.L.

87.

364.
161.

Wiso01.sin s elas to stand alone in opposing the rule.
In 43 Wis. 513 the court comes out very strongly against
it and invokes the principles of Thorogeod vs. Bryan.
The same rule was asserted in 47 Wis. 422.

In this lat-

ter case the court failed to give any reason of its own
but says it believes in th e maxim "stare decisis" and
refers directly to the other Wisconsin case.
Upon what principles of justice Wisconsin bases her
decision it is difficult to understand.

To say that the

plaintiff must bear all the loss when he neither caused,
was responsible for, nor co.Ad have prevented it,
tainly Opposed to common sense and good judgment.

is cerCir-

35

cult Judge Sanborn in one of the cases cited, well said:
"If there exists in the realms of jurisprudence any sound
principles on which so unrighteous a punishment of the innecent and the discharge of' the guilty may be based, I
kave failed to discover it."

PART
Husbar

111.
and Wife.

The cases coming under this rule most often arise
where the husband an& wife are riding together in a carriage and the wife is injured through the joint negligence of a third person and her husband.

The conflict

in the decisions is caused chietly by the great changes
which have been made in the comon law as to the relations of husband ard wife.

Under the old common law

rule which considers the husband and wife as one person
and which denies to the wife the right to bring an action
separately from her husband, it is properly and recessarily held that the negligence of the one is imputed to
the other.

But, under the modern theory and especially

where there has been a very radical change in the common
law,

the decisions are quite uniform.

In 38 Vermont 440 the question came up under the modern theory.

It was anaction against a town for damages

for an injury caused by the joint negligence of the husband and of the town in not keeping the highway in repair.

The court held that the wife was under the care

want
and custody of her husband, and any a
of ordinary care
on his part was attributable to her in the same degree as
if she were acting wholly for herself.
judge says :

The learned

"There is nothing in the marital relation

which would change the situation of the wife in respect
to her husband."

He then continues and attempts to

prove that the true reason for imputing the negligence is
because the husband is agent for the wife.

This is

really the reason upon which the whole opinion is based.
Vermont has always entertained some very strange ideas
upon quest ionAs where one voluntarily places himself in
Sharge of another and her decisions are decidedly against
the weight of authority.

It will be remembered that it

was in this some case that the rule as to public vehicles
was established in this state.
There is a case in 50 Conn. 379, that holds that the
negligence Of the husband is imputed to the wife.

Also

in 60 Iowa 429 there is a similar holding.

But both thes e

cases camne up when the c01mon law rule as to husbid
wife had

been but very slightly modified.

and

At that time

these decisions were in accord with the weight of authority and, as was said before, they were based almost upon
necessity by reason of the then existing relations of
husband and wife.

In the states which have made radical

changes in the common law, the fact that the parties are
husband and wife makes no difference.

3 Mo. appeals 231

distinctly declares that the contributory negligence of
the husband will not bar the action of the wife, she being the injured party.
ed to her.

Again)

His negligence can not be imputll1 N.Y.

199

b

is

not only au-

thority in its own state but is cited ir almost every
state where a similar

case has arisen.

This case very

plainly states that if the husband was negligent his negligence would not be imputed to the wife; that while she
had no right, because her husband was driving to omit to
use reasonable and prudent care to see for herself that
there was no danger, she was not bound to suspect a purpose on the part of her husband not to pretect himself,
until she saw such a dangerous act was being executed.

And as In this case when *he saw she was about to r:ake
the attempt to cross in front of the train, she was not
bound to jump from the wagon,
fere with the driver.

seize the reins or inter-

"Even if she did not entreat him

to stop, but sat silent, it does not follow as a matter
of law, that she was negligent,"
In a recent Indiana case (1894) reported in 38 N.E.
476, the New York doctrine is fully affirmed.

The court

in this case makes a thorough review of all the cases pro
and con and after a very elaborate discussion arrives at
the aforesaid conclusion.

There is avery peculiar and

exceptional case on this subject reported in 45 Dhio St.
470.

The facts in

brief are thus.

The wife of the

plaintiff being ill sent her husband for a harmless medicine.

Plaintiff called at the drug store and asked for

the drug.

The druggist liegligently sold and delivered

to the plaintiff a poisonous drug which the plaintiff
gave to his wife.

She died immediately after taking it

and the plaintiff sues as admiristrat r of his wife.

The

defendant set up the contributory negligence of the husband.

The court said:

"The doctrine of contributory

negligence which is invoked by the defendant is founded

upon considerations which find no application in logic or
justice.

The law having severed the relations of hus-

band and wife, what reason can there be for imputing to
her the contributory negligence of the husband ?"

The

United States Supreme Court also follows this doctrine in
37 Federal Reporter 317.
It is rather difficult to see upon what principle

the husband's negligence is imputable to the wife.
Would whe be liable if his negligence had injured a third
party I?

Certainly she is not responsible for his acts

and had no right or power to control them.

To be sure

she always consents to ride or whatever the case may be,
but as the husband is supposed to be a competent and reas
onable man,

she is

not negligent

in

so doing.

Ought a

wife to be held, by consenting to ride with her husband,
to guarantee his perfect care and diligence ?

She is

injured by the negligence oi' a third party and it seems
unjust and unreasonable to impute her husband's negligelice to her.
In all these cases where the doctrine of imputed
negligence may be applied, the relation of principal and
agent or master and servant properly exists and the dec-

trine rests upon the old maxim,
per se.

qui facit per alium facit

If these relations do not really exist, the

negligence should not be imputed.

It is to be sincerely

and earnestly hoped that the day is

not far distant when

all the courts will refuse to allow him to escape, whose
wrongful act or omission caused the unjury and damage and
who upon consideration of' justice and reason ought to
make compensation for it.

